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GIJS VAN DE KUILEN
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING AND THE
DISCOVERED PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS∗
ABSTRACT. Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect
theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical
expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that
risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward out-
comes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This
article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether
agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they
repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of
their decisions, and are given ample incentives to reﬂect on their deci-
sions, as predicted by Plott’s Discovered Preference Hypothesis (DPH).
The results of a laboratory experiment with N = 62 participants sup-
port this hypothesis. The elicited subjective probability weighting func-
tion converges significantly toward linearity when respondents are asked
to make repeated choices and are given direct feedback after each choice.
Such convergence to linearity is absent in an experimental treatment
where respondents are asked to make repeated choices but do not expe-
rience the resolution of risk directly after each choice, as predicted by
the DPH.
KEY WORDS: learning, probability weighting, rational choice,
nonexpected utility.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D81, D83.
1. INTRODUCTION
A decade of extensive experimentation has convincingly shown
that the reigning economic theory of rational decision making,
expected utility theory (EUT), fails descriptively. Well-known
examples of systematic violations of the EUT paradigm in
∗ I thank Peter P. Wakker for useful comments and suggestions.
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the laboratory are the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953; Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979), the willingness to pay/willingness
to accept disparity (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Kahneman
et al., 1990; Bateman et al., 1997), and the preference reversal
phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971).
These laboratory anomalies have been an important inspira-
tion for the development of various alternative theories of
preference (Starmer, 2000), and directly question the validity
of informing public policy on the basis of classical preference
theory.
Despite its descriptive inadequacy, the classical EUT frame-
work remains the universal standard for many economists.
A possible reason for the hesitation of many economist to
abandon classical theories of preference is that several well-
known experimental economists have questioned the (external)
validity of the observed anomalous behavior by emphasizing
the lack of adequate incentives, sufﬁcient time to learn from
experience, and direct feedback in these experiments (e.g.,
Smith, 1989; Plott, 1996; Binmore, 1999). As the argument
goes, violations of rationality do not persist in real-life situ-
ations and market settings where opportunities to learn from
experience with feedback and incentives via (market) interac-
tion and arbitrage are present and, hence, anomalous behavior
observed in one-shot hypothetical choice experiments with-
out feedback has little relevance to behavior in markets or to
real-life economic behavior in general. Binmore (1999, p. F23)
took an extreme position by stating that “just as chemists
know not to mix reagents in dirty test tubes, [. . . ] there is
no point in testing economic propositions in circumstances
to which they should not reasonably be expected to apply”;
according to Binmore, conventional economic theory only
applies to situations where the problem is reasonably sim-
ple, where there are adequate incentives and there is sufﬁcient
time to learn from experience. In line with this argument,
Charles Plott (1996) hypothesized that agents who participate
in a laboratory experiment have a consistent set of prefer-
ences, but these underlying preferences only surface in choice
environments where subjects are given sufﬁcient opportunities
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING AND THE DPH 3
and incentives for deliberation and learning (Plott, 1996;
Myagkov and Plott, 1997). Plott’s so-called Discovered Prefer-
ence Hypothesis (DPH) thereby insulates EUT from a bulk of
disconﬁrming experimental evidence obtained in single-shot,
hypothetical choice environments without feedback, includ-
ing the aforementioned disconﬁrming experimental evidence
obtained by Allais (1953), Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971),
Lindman (1971), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Knetsch and
Sinden (1984), Kahneman et al. (1990), Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992), and Bateman et al. (1997). Additionally, the DPH
assumes that individual preferences will ultimately converge
to the same underlying preferences regardless of the elicita-
tion process, and hence these underlying preferences are in a
sense discovered when agents repeatedly face similar decisions,
receive feedback on the consequences of their decisions, and
are given ample incentives to reﬂect on their decisions (Cubitt
et al., 2001), contrary to the constructed view of preference
as advocated by some psychologists (Slovic, 1995; Kahneman,
1996). In line with Braga and Starmer (2005), and Cubitt et
al. (2001), we interpret the DPH in such a way that it pre-
dicts that the underlying preferences of agents are consistent
with the normatively compelling axioms underpinning EUT,
and, hence, the DPH predicts that utility for money is a stable
concept.
A natural question to ask is whether the existing empirical
evidence is consistent with the DPH. Indeed there is (some)
evidence that anomalous behavior such as the willingness to
pay/willingness to accept disparity (Coursey et al., 1987; Sho-
gren et al., 1994), the endowment effect (Myagkov and Plott,
1996; List, 2004; Plott and Zeiler 2005), and the preference
reversal phenomenon (Cox and Grether, 1996; Braga and
Starmer, 2003), decays in repeated market settings with feed-
back and incentives, as predicted by the DPH. In addition,
the results of a recent experiment performed by van de Kuilen
and Wakker (2006) support the predictions of the DPH in
case of the common ratio version of the Allais paradox,
which is a tendency for preferences between a safe prospect
that yields a prize of s euro with probability p and nothing
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otherwise, and a risky prospect that yields a prize of r euro
with probability 0.8p and nothing otherwise (with s < r and
0 ≤ p ≤ 1), to be affected by the value of p, contradicting
EUT.1 More specifically, preferences are often found to switch
from safe to risky if p changes from 1 to an intermediate
value (see Camerer, 1995). Prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) can accom-
modate this choice pattern by allowing probabilities to be
weighted in a nonlinear way. More specifically, in the pros-
pect theory framework, the probability weighting function is
assumed to have an inverse S-shape, which implies that agents
are overly sensitive to extreme probabilities relative to inter-
mediate probabilities, thus explaining the occurrence of the
common ratio (and the common consequence-) version of
the Allais paradox. Since subjective probability weighting can
cause individual preferences to become inconsistent with the
normatively compelling axioms of EUT, it is considered to be
an irrational component of risk attitudes by most economists.
Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2006) found that individual
choice behavior in the Allais paradox converged significantly
to the predictions of EUT in an experimental treatment where
respondents were given adequate incentives, sufﬁcient oppor-
tunities for deliberation and learning, and direct feedback
after each choice, whereas such greater conformity between
the observed choice behavior and the predictions of EUT was
absent in an experimental treatment where participants made
repeated decisions but only received feedback at the end of
the experiment when one of their choices was selected to be
played out for real. The convergence of individual preferences
toward rationality in the treatment with ongoing outcome
feedback is in line with the DPH, because, as we interpret
it, the DPH assumes that utility for money is a stable con-
cept, whereas subjective probability weighting is not. Thus,
the DPH predicts that participants in an experimental set-
ting become more sensitive toward probabilities (i.e., indi-
vidual choice behavior becomes more rational) by the direct
resolution of uncertainty and the experience of the resulting
outcome. Consider for example an agent who initially prefers
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a safe prospect that yields 30 euro for certain to a prospect
that yields 40 euro with probability 0.8, and nothing other-
wise. A psychological explanation for this choice is that the
respondent anticipates a sense of regret when he chose the
risky prospect and would fail to win a prize, which, in the
prospect theory framework, amounts to the agent being overly
sensitive toward certainty. Repeating the choice task may then
cause the agent to become more sensitive toward probabil-
ities because repetition itself represses psychological motives
(Loewenstein, 1999) and/or because respondents initially fail
to foresee the affective qualities corresponding to the conse-
quence of their choice (Cubitt et al., 2001).2 This explains
the presence of convergence of individual choice behavior to
rationality in the experimental treatment with ongoing out-
come feedback and the absence of such convergence in the
experimental treatment with terminal outcome feedback as
reported by van de Kuilen et al. (2006).
Whether or not subjective probability weighting is a sta-
ble concept is an important question, because subjective prob-
ability weighting explains several often-observed systematic
behavioral anomalies in stated preferences such as the coex-
istence of insurance and gambling, the reﬂection effect, and
the aforementioned Allais paradox. This article addresses this
question by experimentally testing the hypothesis that partic-
ipants in an experiment become more sensitive toward prob-
abilities when they are given the opportunity to learn from
past decisions and directly experience the consequence of their
decision by direct resolution of the risks involved after each
choice, as predicted by the DPH. For this purpose, we repeat-
edly use a parameter-free measurement technique to obtain
probability weighting functions introduced by van de Kuilen
et al. (2007). The experimental results show that significant
convergence of the probability weighting function toward lin-
earity is indeed present in an experimental treatment where
respondents make repeated choices and directly experience
the resolution of risk after each choice. Such convergence to
rationality is absent in an experimental treatment with ter-
minal outcome feedback, suggesting that choice irrationalities
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caused by subjective probability transformation in decision
environments with repetition and direct feedback are less per-
sistent than often believed.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 reviews prospect theory. Section 3 presents the details
of the experimental design and explains the measurement
technique we used to obtain individual probability weighting
functions in a parameter-free way. The results of the experi-
ment are reported in Section 4, followed by a discussion of
these results and conclusions in Section 5. Finally, the experi-
mental instructions can be found in the Appendix.
2. PROSPECT THEORY
In this article, prospect theory refers to the cumulative version
of prospect theory, introduced by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). It corrects some theoretical problems of the original
version of prospect theory, and can also deal with uncer-
tainty, i.e., the case of unknown probabilities. In this arti-
cle, we only consider positive monetary outcomes and, hence,
loss aversion, another important aspect of prospect theory,
plays no role. A prospect is a probability distribution over
outcomes taking only ﬁnitely many outcomes; (p1 :x1, . . ., pn :
xn) denotes a prospect yielding outcome xi with probability
pi, where probabilities are nonnegative and sum to 1. For two
outcomes, we suppress the second probability, and write (p :
x1, x2) for (p: x1, 1−p: x2). Under prospect theory, each out-
come xi receives a subjective decision weight, denoted by πi,
which is obtained by subtracting the weighted probability of
receiving only an outcome rank-ordered strictly better than xi
from the weighted probability of receiving xi, or an outcome
rank-ordered strictly better. That is, for a prospect (p1: x1, . . .,
pn: xn) with x1 ≥· · ·≥xn:
πi =w(pi +· · ·+p1)−w(pi−1 +· · ·+p1), (2.1)
where w : [0,1] → [0,1] is a strictly increasing and continu-
ous probability weighting function, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
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where U(xi) is a continuous and strictly increasing utility func-
tion. EUT results as a special case, if w(p) = p for all p, so
that πi = (pi +· ·+p1)− (pi−1 +· ·+p1)=pi for all i.
3. THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
3.1. Participants
N =64 undergraduate students participated in the experiment.
Participants were undergraduate students from a wide range
of disciplines randomly recruited at the University of Amster-
dam through the e-mail list of CREED. 41% of the subjects
were female, 59% were economics students, and the average
age of the subjects was 21.7 years.
3.2. Procedure
The experiment was individual and computerized. Partici-
pants were seated in front of a personal computer and ﬁrst
received experimental instructions (see Appendix). Then they
were asked to answer two practice choice questions to famil-
iarize them with the experimental procedures. The choice
questions were part of a larger experiment that all involved
outright choices between two prospects named prospect L
(left) and prospect R (right). The experiment itself was purely
individual, and subjects made their choices under the direct
supervision of the experimenter. Both prospects yielded prizes
depending on the outcome of a roll of two 10-sided dice,
generating probabilities j /100.3 Prospects were framed as in
Figure 1 below.
Participants were asked to indicate their choice by click-
ing on the button of their preferred prospect with the mouse.
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       PROSPECT L
       roll probability    prize
    1 till p               p % xi−1 euro
p+1 till 100     (100 − p)% Y   euro
       PROSPECT R
       roll probability    prize
    1 till p p %  xi euro
p+1 till 100    (100 − p)% y  euro
Figure 1. The framing of the prospect pairs
We used the neutral term prospect in the instructions to avoid
potential confounding effects resulting from connotations with
words such as lottery or gamble, and the position of each
prospect was counterbalanced between participants to avoid a
potential representation effect.
3.3. Stimuli of the ﬁrst part
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, we used the tradeoff
method introduced by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) to elicit a
sequence of three outcomes that are equally spaced in terms
of utility. Therefore, indifferences (1/4:x1, 3) ∼ (1/4:x0, 4) and
(1/4:x2, 3) ∼ (1/4:x1, 4), with x0 =6 were elicited. Applying the
prospect theory formula to these indifferences, subtracting the
resulting equations, dividing both sides by w(1/4), and rear-
ranging terms yields:
U(x2)−U(x1)=U(x1)−U(x0) (3.1)
That is, under prospect theory, the obtained sequence of out-
comes (x0, x1, x2) is equally spaced in utility, irrespective
of subjective probability transformation (Wakker and Den-
effe, 1996). Contrary to other elicitation techniques often used
to measure individual utility functions such as the certainty
equivalent method, the probability equivalent method, and
the lottery equivalent method (McCord and de Neufville,
1986), the tradeoff method retains validity under expected
utility, the original version of prospect theory, rank-dependent
utility, and cumulative prospect theory.
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Since all further measurements in the experiment depended
on the obtained indifference outcomes x1 and x2, these
outcomes were elicited twice and the average of the two out-
comes obtained was used as input in the rest of the experi-
ment in order to reduce noise. To obtain indifference between
prospects we used a bisection method similar to the method
used by Abdellaoui (2000) and van de Kuilen et al. (2007).
More specifically, on the basis of results of a pilot exper-
iment, we hypothesized that indifference outcome x1 would
not exceed x0 + 10 and took the interval [x0, x0 + 10] as the
ﬁrst indifference interval, denoted by [1, u1]. To construct the
j+1th indifference interval from the j th indifference interval
[j , uj ], we determined whether the midpoint (j + uj )/2 of
[j , uj ] was larger or smaller than x1. To do so, we observed
the choice between (0.25:(j + uj )/2, 3) and (0.25:x0, 4). A
choice for the prospect (0.25:(j + uj )/2, 3) meant that the
midpoint of the indifference interval was larger than the indif-
ference outcome x1, so that x1 was contained in [j , (j +uj )/2],
which was then deﬁned as the j+1th indifference interval [j+1,
uj+1]. A choice for the prospect (0.25:x0, 4) meant that the mid-
point of the indifference interval was smaller than the indiffer-
ence outcome x1, so that x1 was contained in [(j +uj )/2, uj ],
which was then deﬁned as the j+1th indifference interval [j+1,
uj+1]. The computer performed ﬁve such iteration steps, ending
up with the indifference interval [6, u6] (of length 10× 2−5),
and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference outcome x1.
The same process was followed to elicit indifference outcome
x2 (substitute x2 for x1 and x1 for x0 above).
3.4. Stimuli of the second part: subjective probability weighting
In the second part of the experiment, we used the measure-
ment technique introduced by van de Kuilen et al. (2007)
to obtain probabilities w−1(1/2), w−1(3/4), and w−1(7/8) in
a parameter-free way, where w−1(t) denotes the probability
corresponding to a subjective probability weight of t . Hence,
we only measured the upper part of the probability weighting
function for each participant in order to make the experi-
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ment not too long. 4 We elicited individual inference between
the prospects L= (p:x2, d:x1, r:x0) and R= (p + g:x2, r + b:x0)
with r the residual probability 1− p − d. Applying the pros-
pect theory formulas to this indifference, subtracting the com-
mon term U(x0) from both sides of the equation and dividing
both sides by U(x1)−U(x0), which according to equation (3.1)
is equal to 1/2 (U(x2)−U(x0)), yields:
w(p+g)= (w(p)+w(p+d))/2. (3.2)
That is, under prospect theory, indifference between prospects
L and R implies that probability p + g is the w midpoint
between probability p and probability p + d (van de Kuilen
et al., 2007). Note that this measurement technique prescribes
the use of different prospects L in the elicitation procedure.5
To ﬁnd probability g that generated indifference between
prospects L and R, the same bisection method as used by van
de Kuilen et al. (2007) was used. Thus, the computer itera-
tively narrowed down so-called indifference intervals contain-
ing p + g, as follows. The ﬁrst indifference interval [1, u1]
was [p, p + d], which contained probability p +g by stochas-
tic dominance. Thus, for probability w−1(1/2), the ﬁrst indif-
ference interval was [0,1], while the ﬁrst indifference intervals
for probabilities w−1(3/4) and w−1(7/8) were [w−1(1/2), 1] and
[w−1(3/4), 1], respectively. To construct the j+1th indifference
interval [j+1, uj+1] from the j th indifference interval [j , uj ],
we determined whether the midpoint of [j , uj ] was larger or
smaller than p+g. To do so, we observed the choice between
the prospects (p:x2, d:x1, r:x0) and ((j +uj )/2:x2, x0). A choice
for the prospect ((j + uj )/2:x2, x0) meant that the midpoint
was larger than p + g, so that p + g was contained in [j ,
(j + uj )/2], which was then deﬁned as the j + 1th indiffer-
ence interval [j+1, uj+1]. A choice for the prospect (p:x2, d:x1,
r:x0) meant that the midpoint was smaller than p+g, so that
p+g was contained in [(j +uj )/2, uj ], which was then deﬁned
as the j+1th indifference interval [j+1, uj+1]. The computer
performed ﬁve such iteration steps, ending up with [6, u6],
and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference probability
p+g.
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Since prospects yielded prizes depending on the result of
a roll with two 10-sided dice, we only allowed values j /100
for probabilities. When a particular midpoint probability was
not a value j /100, the computer took the closest value j /100
on the left of this value if the value was lower than half,
and on the right of this value if the value was higher than
half.
3.5. Stimuli of the third part & treatments
In the third part of the experiment, participants were ran-
domly subdivided over two treatments. In both treatments,
probabilities w−1(1/2), w−1(3/4), and w−1(7/8), were elicited
twice for each respondent, using the same measurement tech-
nique as in the second part of the experiment. The treatments
solely differed in the amount of feedback that respondents
received.
In the terminal feedback treatment, probabilities w−1(1/2),
w−1(3/4), and w−1(7/8) were simply elicited twice again, sim-
ilar as during the second part of the experiment. Hence,
respondents did not directly experience the consequence of
each decision by direct resolution of the risk involved after
each choice.
In the ongoing feedback treatment, respondents were asked
to roll the 10-sided dice directly after each choice, to directly
determine the prize of the chosen prospect. Respondents then
had to type in the result of their roll under the supervi-
sion of the experimenter and the computer would display the
resulting prize of the chosen prospect on the computer screen.
Respondents were told that if that particular choice question
would then be randomly selected to be played out for real
at the end of the experiment, the prize of the chosen pros-
pect would thus already have been determined. Hence, after
each choice, participants directly received feedback from their
choices and, therefore, directly experienced the resolution of
the risk involved and the consequence of their decision.
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3.6. Motivating participants
We used performance-based real incentives to motivate par-
ticipants based on the random lottery incentive system, the
nowadays almost exclusively used incentive system for indi-
vidual choice experiments (Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Harri-
son et al., 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002). At the end of the
experiment, respondents were asked to roll two 10-sided dice
in order to select one of their choices. The chosen prospect in
that particular decision was played out for real, and the sub-
ject was paid out accordingly and in private. The main feature
of this rewarding scheme is that it avoids income effects such
as Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) house money effect, while it
has been shown empirically that it is indeed incentive compat-
ible. In particular, respondents do not interpret choice tasks
rewarded with the random lottery incentive system as one
grand overall lottery (Cubitt et al., 1998; Starmer and Sugden,
1991).
Finally, note that answers from previous questions were
reused in a later choice question during the experiment. As
noted by Harrison (1986), this chained nature of the experi-
ment could give subjects incentives for not truthfully answer-
ing questions so as to improve future stimuli. However, in
order to exploit this chaining, subjects not only had to be
aware of the presence of the chaining, but also had to under-
stand the way in which future stimuli depended on current
answers, which is highly unlikely. Indeed, results from a ques-
tionnaire at the end of a similar experiment showed that no
subject was aware of the chained nature of the experiment
(van de Kuilen et al., 2006). The prizes of the prospects
faced by the respondents varied from C3 to approximately C25.
The average payment was C8.65, while the experiment lasted
approximately 25minutes.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We excluded seven participants form the analysis because
they clearly gave systematic heuristic answers, such as always
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choosing the left prospect or always choosing the right pros-
pect. The following analysis is based on the remaining 57 sub-
jects.
4.1. The utility function
Two 2-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that the ﬁrst
and second measurement of indifference values x1 and x2
did not differ significantly from each other (for x1: z = 1.54,
p-value= 0.1249, for x2: z=1.62, p-value= 0.1046). The obtai-
ned median indifference values of x1 and x2 were 8.98 and
11.49, respectively, which might suggest the existence of a con-
vex utility function. However, a two-sided Sign test indicates
that this deviation from linearity is not statistically significant
(p-value= 0.1263). This ﬁnding supports the conjecture that
utility is approximately linear for small to moderate monetary
amounts (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996).
4.2. The probability weighting function
The obtained median values of w−1(1/2), w−1(3/4), and w−1
(7/8) over all respondents and treatments were 0.74, 0.88, and
0.92, respectively. This suggests that subjects generally un-
derweighted probabilities, which is consistent with the results
from common ﬁndings in the ﬁeld for probabilities exceeding
0.5, and can explain the existence of several choice anoma-
lies such as the common-ratio and the common-consequence
effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu,
1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000).
Figure 2 below displays the obtained probability weight-
ing functions based on median data. For clariﬁcation, the
probability weighting function labeled 1st is the probability
weighting function obtained in the second part of the experi-
ment. Hence, respondents in both treatments did not receive
any feedback during the elicitation procedure of this prob-
ability weighting function. The probability weighting func-
tion labeled 2nd and 3rd are the two probability weighting
functions elicited in the third part of the experiment. Thus,






















Figure 2. The obtained probability weighting functions
during the elicitation procedure of these probability weight-
ing functions, respondents did not receive any feedback after
each choice in the terminal feedback treatment, while they
did receive direct feedback in the treatment with ongoing out-
come feedback, as explained in Section 3.2. As can be seen
in Figure 2, the probability weighting function converges to
linearity under the ongoing feedback treatment, but such con-
vergence is absent in the treatment with terminal outcome
feedback. Also, convergence to linearity is most pronounced
for probabilities w−1(3/4) and w−1(7/8). Table I below presents
the results from several one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
performed to test the hypotheses that the obtained probabil-
ities w−1(s) are significantly larger than probabilities s under
the different treatments, for each of the three obtained prob-
ability weighting functions.
First, the results of the non-parametric tests show that
deviations from linearity are indeed present and persistent
in the treatment with terminal outcome feedback. The only
obtained probability that does not differ significantly from
linearity is probability w−1(7/8) measured in the ﬁrst part of
the experiment. All other probabilities deviate significantly
from linearity, showing that deviations from linearity are pres-
ent and persistent over time under the terminal feedback
treatment.
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING AND THE DPH 15
TABLE I
Counts of w−1(p)−p>0 over time & treatments
Terminal feedback Ongoing feedback
(N =30) (N =27)
w(p)−1 −p 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
p=1/2 22* 19* 22* 20* 19* 20*
p=3/4 21* 23* 21* 19* 15 13
p=7/8 18 22* 21ms 21ms 14 17
Note: *(ms) denotes significance at the 5%(10%) level using a one-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
For the ﬁrst obtained probability weighting function under
the ongoing feedback treatment, all obtained probabilities dif-
fer (marginally) significantly from linearity. However, as Table
I shows, the obtained probabilities w−1(3/4) and w−1(7/8) do
not differ significantly from linearity when they are mea-
sured the second and third time under the treatment with
ongoing outcome feedback. In addition, a series of two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that there is a significant
difference between the ﬁrst and the third obtained probabil-
ity weighting function in the ongoing feedback treatment (for
w−1(1/2): z = 3.232, p-value= 0.001, for w−1(3/4): z=2.993,
p-value= 0.003, and for w−1(7/8): z=2.418, p-value= 0.016),
whereas this significant difference is absent in the terminal
feedback treatment (for w−1(1/2): z=−0.238, p-value= 0.812,
for w−1(3/4): z = 0.185, p-value= 0.853, and for w−1(7/8): z =
0.185, p-value= 0.853). Hence, these results show that conver-
gence of probability weighting to linearity occurs only in the
treatment with ongoing outcome feedback, that is, individual
choice behavior only converges to rationality if participants
experience the resolution of any risk directly after each choice.
5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
As a reaction to the existence of several systematic behav-
ioral anomalies in stated preferences, which directly question
16 GIJS VAN DE KUILEN
the validity of using classical techniques to elicit preferences,
several leading experimental economists have stressed the
importance of proper learning and incentives, such as occur-
rings in many real-life situations and markets, when testing
economic theories in the laboratory (Smith, 1989; Plott, 1996;
Binmore, 1999).
According to this argument, in many (market) situations,
agents receive feedback, have sufﬁcient time to learn from
experience, and are motivated by proper incentives, and, there-
fore, irrational behavior cannot persist. This argument has
been summarized by Plott’s Discovered Preference Hypothesis,
which assert that “individuals have a consistent set of pref-
erences over states, but such preferences only become known
to the individual with thought and experience” (Myagkov and
Plott, 1997, p. 821). Hence, this hypothesis directly challenges
the validity of all disconﬁrming evidence obtained in one-off
hypothetical choice environments. The results of the experi-
ment presented in this article conﬁrm the predictions of the
DPH in casu prospect theory’s subjective probability weight-
ing: individual preferences became more consistent with the
normative predictions of EUT in an experimental treatment
where subjects had the opportunity to learn from past deci-
sions and immediately experienced the possible outcome of
each decision; the subjective probability weighting function
converged significantly to linearity in this treatment. Such sig-
nificant convergence to linearity was absent in the experimen-
tal treatment without any feedback directly after each choice,
supporting the DPH.
Thus, on the one hand, our results suggest that choice irra-
tionalities in decision environments with repetition and feed-
back are less persistent than often believed. On the other
hand, our results suggest that the classical EUT applies only
to choice situations where agents make repeated decisions,
and “what is repeated must include not only the act of deci-
sion, but also the resolution of any uncertainty and the expe-
rience of the resulting outcome” (Cubitt et al., 2001, p. 393).
Of course, defenders of the classical EUT model could argue
that in many economically relevant choices, agents can apply
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what they learn in one situation to their behavior in another.
However, the existing empirical evidence suggests that there
is limited transfer of knowledge across tasks (Loewenstein,
1999). Hence, exploring anomalous behavior and developing
new models of preference that can explain these anomalies is
a relevant and important topic for future research.
APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
[Instructions have been translated from Dutch to English]
Welcome at this experiment. If you have any question while read-
ing these instructions, please raise your hand. The experimenter
will then come to your table to answer your question. This exper-
iment takes about half an hour. We ask you to make a num-
ber of decisions during this experiment. Each time, you choose
between two so-called “prospects.” Both prospects yield certain
prizes depending on the roll of the two 10-sided dice similar to the
ones that are lying on your table right now.
As you can see, one 10-sided die has the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, and 9 and the other 10-sided die has the values 00, 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90. If we code the sum of the roll “a 0
and a 00” as 100, the sum of a roll with both 10-sided dice thus,
yields a random number from 1 up until 100.
The prospects from which you have to choose named Pros-
pect L (left) and Prospect R (right) will be presented in the
following way:
       PROSPECT L
       roll probability    prize
    1 till 40 40 %  10 euro
  41 till 100         60 %             5 euro
       PROSPECT R
       roll probability    prize
    1 till 20            20 %           15 euro
  21 till 100          80 %             2 euro
In this case, Prospect L yields a prize of 10 Euro if the sum
of the roll with both 10-sided dice is 1 up until 40, and if the
sum of a roll is 41 up until 100, Prospect L yields a prize of
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5 Euro, as you can see. Similarly, Prospect R yields a prize of
15 Euro if the sum of a roll with both 10-sided dice is 1 up
until 20, and otherwise Prospect R yields a prize of 2 Euro,
in this case.
Both the prizes and the probabilities of yielding certain
prizes can vary across decisions. We ask you to choose
between Prospect L and Prospect R each time, by clicking the
corresponding button with the mouse.
At the end of this experiment, we will ask you to randomly
select one of you decisions by rolling the two 10-sided dice.
Then, the prize of the prospect you have chosen in that par-
ticular decision will be determined by rolling the two 10-sided
dice again. Only the resulting prize of the chosen prospect will
be paid out for real.
There are no right or wrong answers during this experiment.
It exclusively concerns your own preferences. In them, we are
interested. At every decision, it is best for you to choose the
prospect that you want most. Surely, if you select the envelope
containing the blue card at the end of the experiment, that deci-
sion can be selected at the end of the experiment. Then, the
chosen prospect will be played out. Of course, you would like
that prospect to be the prospect you want most. If you have
no further questions, you can now start with the experiment by
clicking on the “Continue” button below.
NOTES
1. According to EUT, a decision maker weakly prefers the safe (risky)
prospect to the risky (safe) prospect, if and only if U(s) = 0.8U(r)
(U(s) = 0.8U(r)), where U(.) is a strictly increasing and continuous
utility function scaled such that U(0) = 0. Hence, preferences between
the safe and the risky prospect are independent of the value of p
under EUT.
2. In the example, after the resolution of the risk involved, the agent
will learn that the non-chosen prospect would have yielded a higher
prize 80% of the time, and experience a sense of regret that he
did not choose the risky prospect instead. This might cause the
respondent to adjust his probability weight attached to probability
0.8 upward, changing the preference of the person from the safe
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prospect to the risky prospect. Thus, in the example, the agent ini-
tially chose the safe prospect because he underestimated the pain of
regret he would feel when the risky prospect would yield a higher
prize and/or overestimated the pain of regret he would feel when the
risky prospect would yield nothing.
3. One 10-sided die was numbered from 0 till 9, while the other
10-sided die was numbered from 00 till 90. Since we informed sub-
jects that the roll 0–00 would be coded as 100, the sum of a roll
with both 10-sided dice resulted in a random number ranging from
1 till 100.
4. We chose to measure the upper part of the probability weighting
function, in order to be able to relate our results with van de Kuilen
et al. (2006) ﬁndings, because the upper part explains the occurrence
of the common ratio version of the Allais paradox. More specifically,
according to prospect theory, the common ratio version of the Allais
paradox occurs because agents relatively overweight certainty com-
pared to probability 0.8, a phenomenon often called the certainty
effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
5. More specifically, we elicited the probabilities w−1(1/2), w−1(3/4),
and w−1(7/8), such that individuals were indifferent between the
prospects (x1) and (w−1(1/2):x2, x0), the prospects (w−1(1/2):x2,
x1) and (w−1(3/4):x2, x0), and the prospects (w−1(3/4):x2, x1) and
(w−1(7/8):x2, x0).
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